Interest as Damages in Colorado by Magill, Nicholas H.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 28 Issue 8 Article 5 
June 2021 
Interest as Damages in Colorado 
Nicholas H. Magill 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Nicholas H. Magill, Interest as Damages in Colorado, 28 Dicta 285 (1951). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
INTEREST AS DAMAGES IN COLORADO
NICHOLAS H. MAGILL*
of the Denver Bar
The purpose of this study is to inquire into the law of Colo-
rado with respect to the rights of a party litigant to recover inter-
est on, or as, damages for the injury to, or the detention, loss or
destruction of, property, where the interest claimed is for a period
of time prior to judgment. Discussion of interest on damages for
personal injuries occasioned by the tort of another is eliminated,
except to note, in passing, that such interest is recoverable from
the time suit is filed by virtue of chapter 50, section 5, of the 1935
Colorado Statutes Annotated.
It is convenient, and perhaps necessary to an orderly approach
to the question of interest, to consider, first, chapter 88, section 2,
of the 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated, which, while enumerating
the circumstances under which interest will be allowed, in effect
provides that interest, where there is no conflicting agreement,
shall be allowed on all claims for money due where the amount
of the claim is liquidated. In substance, this statute provides that
creditors shall be allowed to receive interest, when there is no
agreement as to rate, at the rate of six per cent. per annum for
all moneys after they become due on:
(1) any bill, bond, promissory note, or other instrument in
writing from the time the same becomes due;
(2) any judgment from the date of the entry of the judgment;
(3) money due on mutual settlement of accounts from the date
of such settlement;
(4) money due on account from the date the same became due;
(5) money received to the use of another and retained without
the owner's consent, from the time of the receipt thereof;
and
(6) on money taken or retained and fraudulently converted
to the taker's use, from the time of the taking.
This statute, as now embodied in our statutes, although since
its origin has been subjected to minor amendments, is substantially
the same as the statutes which were in effect at the time the cases
hereinafter cited were decided.
Perhaps the import of the above statute, with respect to inter-
est on claims for unliquidated damages, can in no way be better
manifested than in quoting from the opinion in Denver, South
Park & Pacific R. R. Co. v. Conway,' a leading case on this ques-
tion. This was an action to recover damages for injury to property
as a result of a fire caused by the defendant's negligence. A claim
for interest on the damages was disallowed, the court holding
that: "Interest in this state is a creature of statute and regulated
thereby. It is only recoverable, in absence of contract, in the
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cases enumerated in the statute, and damages to property arising
from the wrong or negligence of a defendant is not one of the
enumerated cases." 2
WHERE DAMAGES ARE UNLIQUIDATED
There are several cases in Colorado which have seemingly
allowed interest on a claim for unliquidated damages, and which
do not come under any of the circumstances enumerated in the
interest statute. At first blush, these cases appear to conflict with
the rule set forth in Railroad v. Conway, supra; but, upon exami-
nation, it will be found that in all these cases there was a wrongful
detention of property. While an equivalent of interest on the value
of the property detained was recovered, it was not recovered as
interest, as such, but as damages for the detention of the property,
the legal rate of interest being used merely as a convenient meas-
ure of the plaintiff's loss occasioned by the detention of his prop-
erty by the defendant. The distinction is emphasized in the fol-
lowing cases.
Machette v. Wanless 3 was an action of replevin for grain in
which the plaintiff was permitted to recover, as damages for the
detention of the grain, an amount equal to legal interest on the
value of the property for the period of the detention. The court
used the interest rate as a convenient measure of the damages for
the detention, and not to allow recovery of interest as such. This
is brought out in the following quotation.
Where the property is domestic animals, valuable for service
only, the value of the use of the animals is, of course, the measure
of compensation; but where, as in this case, the article is intended
for consumption, interest upon the value of it would seem to be the
true compensation. If the owner of grain should wish to obtain the
like quantity, he must purchase in the market, at current prices, and
he would be deprived of the use of the money thus invested. The
best estimate of his loss is interest upon the amount of money which
he would, for that purpose, be compelled to pay out.'
Omaha & Grant Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Tabor 5 was an action
to recover damages for the conversion of ore, in which the plaintiff
was denied, by the trial court, interest as damages for the deten-
tion. The Supreme Court of Colorado, in reversing for this error,
said:
It is true, as stated by the learned Judge, "that interest in this
state is a creature of statute and regulated thereby; that it is only
recoverable, in the absence of contract, in cases enumerated in the
statute; and that damages to property arising from a wrong or
negligence of defendant is not one of the enumerated cases." This
[case] could not come under the last clause of the instruction. It
is not for damages to property. It is for the wrongful detention of
money [since to detain the ore or the money into which it was con-
verted was indirectly to detain the money] belonging to plaintiff.
2 8 Colo. at p. 16, 5 P. at p. 151, Accord: Railroad v. Moynahan, 8 Colo. 56, 5 P.
(1884).
'2 Colo. 169 (1873).
4 2 Colo. at p. 180.
513 Colo. 41, 21 P. 925 (1889).
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It is clearly distinguishable from 1;'ailroad v. Conway, 8 Colo. 1 .... In
our state damages for detention of the money equal to the legal in-
terest upon the value of the chattels converted from the time of the
conversion has been allowed, not as interest, but as damages.6
Greeley, Salt Lake & Pac. R. Co. v. Yount 7 was an action to
recover damages for the unauthorized appropriation of land, in
which it was held, on the authority of Railroad v. Conway, supra,
that interest was not recoverable. The court, confronted with the
decisions in Machette v. Wanless, supra, and Refining Co. v. Tabor,
supra, distinguished these cases on the basis that interest was
there allowed, not as interest, but as damages for the detention
of personal property. Said the court: "These decisions were not
based on the statute, and the statute did not figure in them, except
in so far as the rate of interest which it allowed on money was
used as a criterion by which the damages might be estimated." 8
The foregoing cases would seem to sufficiently emphasize the
distinction between those cases which have allowed interest as
damages and those which have disallowed interest on damages on
an unliquidated claim. In all of the cases in which interest has
apparently been recovered on an unliquidated claim it will be
found that there was a wrongful detention of the plaintiff's prop-
erty by the defendant, and the interest was allowed, not as inter-
est, as such, but as damages for the detention.
WHERE FRAUD IS INVOLVED
There is another line of cases in Colorado-those dealing with
fraud in the sale of property-in which the courts have again
seemingly permitted a recovery of interest in conflict with the
rule that interest, as such, can only be recovered under the cir-
cumstances enumerated in the statute. But, again, a study of
these cases will reveal that the interest was not recovered on dam-
ages, but rather as damages. Although in these cases there has
not been a detention of property in the technical sense, still, the
conduct of the defendant, in a practical sense, is tantamount to
a withholding of the plaintiff's property, and the interest has been
allowed, as in the conversion cases, as damages for the wrongful
withholding of property from the plaintiff. Let us consider some
of these cases.
Mayo v. Wallgreen 9 was an action for deceit in the purchase
of land. The defendant, having an option to buy land at $100 per
acre, falsely represented to the plaintiff that he was to pay $150
per acre, and induced the plaintiff to join with him in the pur-
chase of the land at the higher figure. The plaintiff, upon learning
that the defendant had purchased the land at the lesser figure,
while plaintiff's contribution to the defendant had been at the
higher figure, sought damages for the deceit. The court held that
the plaintiff was entitled to recover the difference between the
613 Colo. at p. 57, 21 P. at 931.
7 Colo. App. 189, 42 P. 1023 (1895).
8 7 Colo. App. at p. 193, 42 P. at p. 1025.
'9 Colo. App. 506, 50 P. 40 (1897).
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the two prices with interest from the time plaintiff gave defend-
ant the money until the date of recovery. Said the court:
In this state, in the absence of some statutory provision per-
mitting interest to be recovered, it may not generally enter into or
form a part of the damages which a party may receive if he gets
judgment. The general rule is subject to some exceptions, and we are
of the opinion that this case is brought within the exception sanc-
tioned by the Supreme Court. Omaha & Grant Smelting and Ref. Co.
v. Tabor, 13 Colo. 41."1 [sapra].
The opinion is devoid of any discussion, other than the lan-
guage above quoted, of the exception to the general interest rule
under which this case was held to come. It is clear, however, that
the Court of Appeals was referring to the rule of the conversion
and detention cases as the exception to the general interest rule.
This is manifest in the court's citation of Refining Co. v. Tabor,
discussed supra, as authority for its holding.
Three later cases apparently contra to the Mayo case are
Clark v. Giacomini 11 Keeney v. Angell,1
2 and Otis v. Grimes.13
These were actions to recover damages for false representations
inducing an exchange of property, indistinguishable in fact, to
this writer's mind, from the Mayo case. Apparently ignoring the
Mayo case, or else tacitly declining to follow it, our Supreme Court
held that interest was not recoverable, making no distinction be-
tween interest on and interest as damages.
But a still later case dealing with fraud in the exchange of
property, in which the distinction between interest on and interest
as damages has again been observed, is Bankers Trust Co. v. Inter-
national Trust Co.14 This was an action against a trust company
to recover money paid for mortgage notes, the purchase of which
was allegedly induced by the misrepresentation of the value of
the mortgage security. The plaintiff waived the action in tort for
deceit and, instead, rescinded the contract for fraud, and sued in
quasi-contract to recover the money paid for the notes. The court
held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover interest from the
time of the transaction until restitution was made.
The court, although citing the Clark, Keeney and Otis cases,
supra, for the proposition that interest could not be recovered in
actions for damages for deceit, neither expressly overruled these
cases, nor did it distinguish them. Nor was the case brought within
the purview of the interest statute. But, rather, the interest was
allowed under the authority of the conversion and detention cases,
discussed supra, which permit the recovery of interest as damages
for the detention of property. This is clear from the following
language in the opinion:
Notwithstanding that in this jurisdiction the decisions are
uniform in holding that interest is a creature of statute, and, in
10 9 Colo. App. at p. 518, 50 P. at p. 45.
11 85 Colo. 530, 277 P. 306 (1929).
1292 Colo. 213, 19 P. 2d 215 (1933).
" 97 Colo. 219, 48 P. 2d 788 (1935).
."108 Colo. 15, 113 P. 2d 656 (1941).
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absence of contract, is recoverable as such only in such cases as
are enumerated in the state, [citations omitted] . . . the courts of
this state, even when interest is not recoverable under the statute,
by distinguishing between interest as such, and interest as damages,
many times have allowed the equivalent of interest in the way of
damages, for the tortious taking and detention of money or prop-
erty.5
To bring the case within the rule of the conversion and de-
tention cases, the court reasoned that where, as here, the defrauded
party rescinds the contract, the recission relates back to the time
of the fraudulent transaction; that there is a duty upon the de-
fendant to make restitution, and a concurrent breach of that duty,
as of the time of the fraudulent transaction; and that (although
this is not expressly stated by the court, it seems a necessary and
proper inference from that which was expressly stated) the breach
of the duty to make restitution was tantamount to a detention of
the plaintiff's money.
Now, let us consider the distinction, if any, between this case
and the Clark, Keeney, and Otis cases, supra. The fact that the
Bankers Trust Co. case was an action ex contractu, following a
recission for fraud, while the latter cases were actions ex delicto
for deceit, glaringly presents itself to be seized as the point of
distinction. It is easy-too easy-to accept this as the basis of dis-
tinction and conclude that there is a real difference in fact, when
difference there is none. The distinction is in form only. It is
illusory, and vanishes as we look to the substance of the respective
actions, the substance being the tortious conduct of the defend-
ants upon which their legal liabilities are predicated. In all of
these cases the substance-the tortious conduct-was the same,
to wit: fraud and misrepresentation in the exchange of property.
In all, the plaintiffs were wrongfully deprived of money through
the conduct of the defendants which was tantamount to a deten-
tion of the plaintiff's money.
True it is, in the law of damages, that the basis of recovery
in actions ex contractu is n6t the same as in actions ex delicto;
the basis of the former being the value of the benefit to the de-
fendant, while the latter is the detriment to the plaintiff. But
this distinction, although important in other respects in the law
of damages, would seem to be immaterial to the question of inter-
est as damages in fraud cases. Where a defendant has obtained
money or other property from a plaintiff through fraud, there is
both a benefit to the defendant and a detriment to the plaintiff,
the quantum of each, although theoretically different, can be con-
veniently measured only by using the interest rate as the criterion.
The writer does not disagree with the decision in the Bankers
Trust Co. case, nor does he doubt the validity of the court's reason-
ing as a matter of abstract law. He submits, however, that rea-
soning along the line of recission and relation back to the time of
the fraudulent transaction with a breach of a duty to make resti-
15 108 Colo. at p. 33, 113 P. 2d at p. 665.
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tution, was not necessary to the decision. The case could have
been brought under the rule of the conversion and detention cases,
as it was, but without the circuitous reasoning set forth above,
upon the authority, of Mayo v. Wallgren, supra, which, it will be
recalled, permitted a recovery of interest in an action ex delicto
for deceit. Of course, the Clark, Keeney, and Otis cases, supra,
which are contra to the Mayo case, would have had to have been
overruled. But, unless we accept the illusory distinction between
actions ex contractu and actions ex delicto in this respect, these
cases have been impliedly overruled anyway by the Bankers Trust
Co. case.
Be that as it may, the point which all of the .cases emphasize
is that, if interest is recoverable at all, it is so recoverable because
the circumstances of the particular case constrain the court to
look upon the defendant's conduct as amounting to a detention,
or a withholding, if you please, of the plaintiff's property. Thus,
interest is recovered, not as such, but as damages for the with-
holding of the property.
In summary, the writer has drawn the following conclusions
as a result of this study:
1. Interest will be allowed as a matter of right on damages
for personal injuries occasioned by the tort of another, pursuant to
CoLo. STAT. ANN., c. 50, § 5 (1935).
2. Interest will be allowed as a matter of right upon any claim
for money due, from the time the same became due until paid in
the cases enumerated in COLO. STAT. Asp,., c. 88, § 2 (1935). It seems
reasonable to conclude that this statute, although it must be strictly
construed, is, nevertheless, sufficiently broad to cover all cases of
claims for money due where the amount of the claim is liquidated.
Of course, if the rate of interest is specified in a contract, the statute
would not be applicable.
3. Interest in this state is a matter of statute, not of common
law, and is recoverable only in cases enumerated in the statutes, and
damages to property arising from the wrong or negligence of a de-
fendant is not enumerated in the statute. Nor will interest be
allowed on damages for the unauthoriZed taking of land, or, stated
conversely, in eminent domain proceedings, for any period prior to
the judgment or the condemnation award.
4. Where there has been a wrongful detention of property, in
an action either in replevin or trover, interest will be allowed from
the time of the conversion until the time of recovery, not as interest
on damages, but as damages for the detention of the property.
5. In actions involving fraud in the exchange of property, where
the circumstances are such that the court can look upon the de-
fendant's conduct as tantamount to a detention of property, the
same rule will be applied to permit the plaintiff to recover interest
as damages from the time of the fraudulent transaction until the
date of recovery.
6. With the exception of interest on damages for personal in-
juries, and interest as damages for the detention, or what amounts
to a detention, of property, interest for any period prior to judg-
ment cannot be recovered in Colorado on an unliquidated claim for
damages.
